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Abstract: The current advancement of robotics, especially in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), leads
to a prominent combination between the mining industry and connected-embedded technologies.
This progress has arisen in the form of state-of-the-art automated giant vehicles with Autonomous
Haulage Systems (AHS) that can transport ore without human intervention. Like CPS, AHS enable
autonomous and/or remote control of physical systems (e.g., mining trucks). Thus, similar to CPS,
AHS are also susceptible to cyber attacks such as Wi-Fi De-Auth and GPS attacks. With the use
of the AHS, several mining activities have been strengthened due to increasing the efficiency of
operations. Such activities require ensuring accurate data collection from which precise information
about the state of the mine should be generated in a timely and consistent manner. Consequently, the
presence of secure and reliable communications is crucial in making AHS mines safer, productive,
and sustainable. This paper aims to identify and discuss the relation between safety of AHS in
the mining environment and both cybersecurity and communication as well as highlighting their
challenges and open issues. We survey the literature that addressed this aim and discuss its pros
and cons and then highlight some open issues. We conclude that addressing cybersecurity issues
of AHS can ensure the safety of operations in the mining environment as well as providing reliable
communication, which will lead to better safety. Additionally, it was found that new communication
technologies, such 5G and LTE, could be adopted in AHS-based systems for mining, but further
research is needed to considered related cybersecurity issues and attacks.
Keywords: cybersecurity; autonomous haulage systems; operating technology; mining industry;
cyber-physical systems; communication; safety
1. Introduction
Since the launch of Industry 4.0, smart machinery and intelligent services have been
unveiled, including quality-controlled systems [1]. Industry 4.0 redirected organizations’
perspective on technology along with its role in developing a viable business model
that increases their profits. Industry 4.0 aims to integrate Operating Technology (OT)
and Information Technology (IT) ecosystems to cope with current business requirements,
such as information sharing and controlling. In the heart of Industry 4.0, Cyber-Physical
Systems (CPS) were shown to be a revolutionary development. CPS are “engineered
systems that integrate information technologies, real-time control subsystems, physical
components and human operators to influence physical processes by means of cooperative
and (semi)automated control functions” [2]. CPS combine real-time communications and
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computer processes with physical world applications to enable autonomous and/or remote
control of physical systems [3].
Mining is an industry that inherits the full advantage of Industry 4.0 by using cutting-
edge driverless vehicles called Autonomous Haulage Systems (AHS) or Autonomous
Haulage Trucks (AHT). These trucks can carry up to four hundred tons of ore and accu-
rately transport it without human interaction. AHS is the state-of-the-art in the mining
industry for autonomous vehicles. Since their first system development endeavor in Chile
in 2005, AHS have attracted attention in the last decade from haulage truck manufacturers
such as Caterpillar and Komatsu. The successful reputations of existing autonomous
mines around the world notably increased the demand for AHS in surface mining dur-
ing the last few years. Komatsu America has reported that its FrontRunner system has
achieved a new milestone record of more than two billion tons of material that was trans-
ported autonomously at CODELCO’s Gabriela Mistral in Chile since the opening of its
first autonomous copper mine in 2008 [4]. Generally, Autonomous Trucks (ATs) have
been designed to reduce the vulnerability to the risk of equipment contact with auxiliary
equipment or Equipped Manual Vehicles (EMVs).
According to the definition of CPS above, the AHS could be seen as a kind of CPS.
The AHS equipment exceedingly relies on wireless communications, including object
avoidance/detection systems, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), e.g., GNSS, and artificial
intelligence. Inside the AHS intelligence system (i.e., FrontRunner for Komatsu and
Command for Caterpillar), all data obtained are compiled so that the software can make
a suitable decision. Calculating the maximum speed allowed to a nearby equipment
or the estimated time for an AT to break are possible decisions. Thus, determining the
exact location of every AT and EMV is mandatory for the trucks to prevent accidents,
which increases safety and decreases the maintenance or replacement cost [5]. ATs have
demonstrated notable fuel consumption performance as a result of their driving consistency.
They can operate on a 24/7 schedule with no idling time as there is no shift change and no
breaks required. Manual truck operators can affect 35% of fuel economy whereas ATs can
improve fuel usage by 4% with 25–50% reduced idle time [5].
With the use of the AHS, several mining activities have been strengthened due to
increasing the efficiency of operations. Such activities require ensuring accurate data
collection from which precise information about the state of the mine should be generated
in a timely and consistent manner. Consequently, the presence of secure and reliable
communications is crucial in making AHS mines safer, productive, and sustainable. The
availability and security issues of communication of AHS the mine environment will be
discussed below.
The availability of communication is an essential service in AHS systems. To the best
of our knowledge, the current AHS mines rely entirely on wireless communication [6],
which employs standard 802.11 Wi-Fi technology operating in the unlicensed spectrum. In
the meantime, technologies (e.g., Wi-Fi) were deemed unfit for industrial communications
due to the lure of Industry 4.0, and the flexibility offered by these technologies made
Wi-Fi attractive for AHS solutions. Specifically, ATs require seamless connectivity to the
network at all times [7]. The geographical challenges and the nature of CPS (AHS) running
in the mine make wireless communications the only possible way to keep track and
ATs connected. Yet, these wireless technologies lead to a set of challenges—for example,
frequency interference, channel utilization, and signal jamming. Furthermore, some special
design concerns should be considered, such as signal propagation and dynamic topology
as the mine keeps growing, so as to obtain efficient and stable contact.
With the integration of OT and IT as in the case of AHS, information sharing becomes
more susceptible to disclosure, intrusion, and other cybersecurity issues and attacks. As
shown above, AHS can be considered as a CPS system, and thus the former can be inte-
grated with OT using mechanisms that are vulnerable to malicious attacks such as Wi-Fi
De-Auth attacks [8], GPS attacks [9], and camera attacks [9,10]. Thus, safety remains an
area of concern as being targeted by traditional cyber-attacks due to the similarities in
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infrastructure with the conventional IT environment. The authors of [11] emphasize that
a lack of security can lead to equipment damage, loss of production, severe injuries, and
fatalities, thus greatly endangering safety.
In this paper, within the mining environment, we aim to identify and discuss the
relation between safety of AHS in the mining environment and both cybersecurity and
communication. We argue that addressing cybersecurity issues of AHS can ensure the
safety of operations in the mining environment, and that providing reliable communication
leads to a better safety. Specifically, we surveyed the literature aiming to study the relation
between (1) cybersecurity and safety and (2) communication and safety of AHS in the
mining environment. In this paper, the term safety refers to the control of any hazards in
order to avoid human injury and mechanical risk. The survey’s main objective is to identify
the pros and cons of the published work at this point as well as to highlight some open
issues for further investigation regarding this field of study.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature review related
to safety accompanied by cybersecurity and communication. In Section 3, future directions
and open issues related to cybersecurity, communication, and safety in AHS are discussed.
Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 4.
2. Literature Review
In the literature review, we investigate AHS mines from three different angles, which
are communication challenges, cybersecurity, and safety. We argue that the AHS envi-
ronment is a subset of the industrial environment that faces similar challenges to other
OT systems with some particularities to the mining environment (e.g., the terrain) and
the associated elements with specific challenges that we try to resolve in this study. We
also contend that business decision making is significantly affected by information shared
between the industrial and IT environments, which invokes the problem of information
accessing or sharing with untrusted networks, e.g., the Internet. We study the standard
communication technologies that arise in the industrial environment and their drawbacks
as well as the possibility to re-enforce them in order to make them more secure. Further-
more, we argue that if communication in the AHS environment is not secure and reliable,
the safety of equipment can be impacted since safety is dependent on the availability of
communication. Finally, we conclude that safety by association is a security service in the
industrial environment, whereas a cyberattack can lead to disastrous consequences.
2.1. Relation between Cybersecurity and Safety in AHS
Security problems have increased and mutated with Industry 4.0; the security issues
in the age of Industry 4.0 are discussed in [12]. In addition, the authors clarify how
evolving innovations have brought new security risks to the industrial climate. In addition,
the convergence of these technologies has provided a gap for new attack surfaces, such
that applying unlicensed wireless communication to mining activities moved current
hazards and challenges of the underlying technology to the OT ecosystem and introduced
a potential for new attacks on the field equipment (AHS trucks).
CPS are dense heterogeneous systems that encompass various sensors and actuators
connected to a pool of computing nodes [13]. Hence, a CPS machine works on perceiving
and analyzing the surrounding physical environment. Accordingly, it acts appropriately
based on the sensed data using intelligence decisions in an autonomous manner. As a
result, ATs are classified as CPS networks, making them susceptible to the same type of
OT attacks. These attacks might threaten communications, storage, actuators, computing
nodes and perceiving sensors [14].
ATs are endpoints (e.g., sensors, actuators) connected to networks and communicating
through a command center with different tiers of security. The authors of [15] address
how the unawareness manipulation of logical and physical controls of devices is the most
devastating effect of taking control of the endpoints, such as field equipment. A successful
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attack on a CPS (e.g., MITM) could be catastrophic [14]. As a result, such attacks may lead
to a loss of quality of services, data integrity/quality, as well as human life.
Since there are no predefined standards that constitute the precise handling of complex
industrial environments, it is feasible to use the existing variety of standards and re-direct
them for a specific purpose [12]. Yet, the integration of cybersecurity issues in an industry
based on ad hoc structures is a naïve approach that can lead to misleading results. This
is because a generic attack study may ignore the main security clues of the CPS, which
aim to achieve a balance among usability, risk, cost, and convenience [13]. CPS could
also be operating in a safe and controlled environment that is secured by other means.
Furthermore, as attacks are generalized, defense perimeter modeling and Root of Trust
(RoT) mechanisms are often overlooked [13].
Cybersecurity issues have posed a serious problem and complex threats to organiza-
tions looking to make the transition to engage in the Industry 4.0 model, according to [16].
The authors established three vulnerability factors in a cyber-physical infrastructure that
may be exploited by cyber-attacks: physical, network, and computation. The potential
of interfering with wireless network communication in the mining community through a
subsequent survey is addressed in [12]. A successful wining attack can have a significant
negative impact on service protection and availability (for example, one of the security
CIA services). A solution called “security by design” is proposed by the authors of [14,15],
which take into consideration several criteria of cybersecurity architecture. Feasibility,
robustness, extensibility, as well as authentication, authorization, network enforced policy,
and secure analytics are counted as security measures [15].
Another area of contention is the exchange of knowledge over dynamic networks in
both industrial and non-industrial atmospheres (i.e., IT) given that the two atmospheres
are geographically or logically isolated. In the age of Industry 4.0, data sharing between
the OT and IT environments is essential for making the optimal business decisions (i.e.,
usually higher management is located in a different facility than current operations) [17].
However, this raises the vulnerability of such sensitive infrastructure, which can be exposed
to untrustworthy networks and attacks. The dynamic nature of the CPS portion, such as a
complex environment, necessitates a unique approach (i.e., considering cybersecurity and
safety). Most data exchange methods, according to [17], are incapable of grasping high-
dynamic scenarios in which several parties (i.e., vendors) cooperate to achieve a shared
purpose, particularly where privacy is factored in. The same authors suggested a solution
based on establishing a dynamic trust zone in which decisions are automatically made
through identifying flows, evaluating them, and deciding whether to allow the flow or
not [17]. Yet, this strategy increases concern about data protection and confidentiality in a
multivendor setting. An additional RoT model is introduced in [13], where a heterogeneous
and static environment is built to manage confidentiality problems such as key delivery
instead of handling each individual variable. This is considered the most effective way to
avoid confidentiality issues.
The protection of GPS positions against malicious attacks is one of the main concerns
in AHS. Haulage trucks depend on GPS-derived positional coordinates, which are sup-
plemented by a detailed map. In an essential feature in automated AVs, these driverless
devices select the shortest routes to reach new locations even without prior knowledge,
which gives rise to vulnerability from malware attacks. Ren et al. [9] demonstrated a
number of realistic GPS attacks that were presented under two categories: spoofing and
jamming. One of the most frequent GPS attacks is to deviate the correct location of the
victims to an incorrect position (i.e., spoofing) by fabricating a spurious signal. Nulling,
another advanced attacking mechanism, aims to cancel GPS signals by encrypting negative
signals that could be used to launch stealthy attacks. Authors in [18] suggested a recent
attack strategy that utilizes selected fake locations to direct the AHT into a predefined area,
using Google Maps, for example. Unfortunately, the inefficient protection of GPS data can
lead to catastrophic truck collisions, which is another safety concern in the AHS.
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Furthermore, since the distinction between industrial and IT networks is becoming
blurred, a need for a coordinated approach becomes evident. As shown in [19], applying a
defense-in-depth strategy to the industrial fields is emphasized since we now have the ca-
pability of mounting new threats that were not inherent in OT. These tactics aim to improve
the overall system’s CIA security triad (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability). This
can be accomplished by enabling the implementation of solutions such as RoT introduced
in [13], which was previously addressed. Meanwhile, when applying security strategies,
antiviruses, patch management technology support, and security compliance, these strate-
gies should take into consideration the distinctions between IT and OT environments. Such
strategies are deemed to be effective when we put the environment we are working under
into perspective. In our situation, for example, we physically secure the autonomous truck
in the beginning, and then the wireless communications on the truck. Afterwards, we
ensure secure tower communications and finally the network backbone.
Autopilots rely extensively on computer vision and Artificial Intelligence (AI) tech-
niques since a vehicle perceives visual data very differently than a person does. Cameras
are critical in autonomous trucks for a variety of tasks, including lane detection, obstacle
detection, parking, and sign recognition [9,10], which raises another security risk. A blurred
camera’s performance breaks a safety standard, increasing the likelihood of fatal accidents
triggered by camera attacks. A typical attack involves the use of a laser matrix to blind
cameras at a close range of less than half a meter, for a few seconds, inflicting irreversible
damage and thereby ruining the autonomous procedures. Optical features are the camera’s
weak point, as physical attacks can hinder the existence of a completely secure camera
system. Nonetheless, Petit et al. [20] suggest that removable near-infrared cut filters and
photochromic lenses provide adequate protection from various angles. A recent study
addresses the use of machine learning to detect and mitigate remote attacks via a dedicated
anti-hacking device [21]. Notably, these attacks sometimes may not require any physical
access to the truck, such as attacks with lasers, and their consequences can be critical. Yet,
some of these assaults do not require physical access to the truck and their effects may be
serious.
Concerning autonomous mining, Labbe [6] notes that existing AHS standards and
literature have always placed a premium on the system’s protection aspect, but never on
its cybersecurity components. In addition, the proposed study [6] claims that developing
a generic threat model for AHS systems is important, which would be applicable to any
OEM and mining facility. In that, Labbe [6] introduces an under development solution
called MM-ISAC, that would align with safety requirements such as ISO17757:2017 and
security standards such as ISO/IEC 27000:2016, ISA99. Although this initiative is still in its
early stages, we anticipate that the MM-ISAC will collaborate closely with vendors to refine
the system specification across all affected areas, including infrastructure, communications,
and cybersecurity, in order to come up with a sound threats model.
Finally, Abdo et al. [22] argue that safety and cybersecurity should be seen in tandem.
Currently used risk assessment approaches treat safety and cyber threats as two distinct
entities, while in the Industry 4.0 era, a safety risk is also a cybersecurity risk. Consider
an AHT and a manual haulage truck; both provide certain safety measures to safeguard
and protect the equipment and operators. However, the only safety concern regarding a
manual truck is if the operator tampers physically with the truck. On the contrary, an AHT
poses the same safety concerns plus a residual risk of it being a CPS connected to an open
network (i.e., Wifi). Hence, the cybersecurity risks is a critical factor that might affect the
safety of the mine. The bowtie and attack tree analysis are utilized by [22], combining safety
and security in risk analysis to generate an exhaustive representation of risk scenarios.
Unfortunately, this method would necessitate the collection of qualitative and quantitative
data to calculate the probability of safety risks. These data are private and often proprietary
to manufacturers as well as not always accessible for analysis, making this study difficult
to conduct further studies to confirm or improve the results. Al-Ali et al. [17] propose
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creating a trust zone to handle sharing such information, but this entails the acceptance of
all parties. Table 1 summarizes some proposed solutions and their challenges.
Table 1. Summary of literature on cybersecurity and safety.
Papers UsedTechniques/Technologies
Security and Safety
Challenges Addressed Advantages Disadvantages
[6]
Combination of existing
standards, e.g., ISO 27000,
ISA99
Existing solutions are





Proposed solution is still





standards to address the
complexity of OT
environment
Same forms of attacks that
occur in the IT world can be
observed in the industrial
arena. Lack of standardized
approach
Some standards are mature
and proven to be effective




practices could be risky as
they are not environment
specific




that were designed to
support general purposed
devices
CPS can benefit from a wide
range of existing




attack. Loss of integrity that
could result in loss of lives
[15] Security by design
Physical, network, and
computation are three fields
that may be exploited
Enforce, Authentication,
Authorization, Network
Enforced Policy, and Secure
Analytics as measures to
reinforce security
Approaching cybersecurity
problems in an industrial ad
hoc manner can lead to
misleading findings because
generalized attack studies
lack the specifics of security
objectives




Dynamic trust zone where
decisions are dynamically
made by defining and
analyzing flows, then
intelligently determine
whether the flow is
permitted
Raises concerns about data
privacy and confidentiality,






The GPS data must be
protected to avoid
GPS-based collisions and





network such as signal
strength
Secure GPS strategies are
not considered in intended
AHS and need to be
investigated further,







Camera attacks (a blurred
camera’s outputs break a
safety standard and increase




protection from a variety of
angles
There are no concrete
solutions for camera
protection in ATs. Camera
attacks can cause inaccurate
detections of obstacles,
lanes, or traffic signs
[22] Bowtie analysis and attacktree analysis
Cybersecurity impacts
safety of mining equipment
Produce an exhaustive
representation of risk
scenarios. To measure the
risk of safety threats,
quantitative and qualitative
data are required
Data are usually privately
owned by manufacturers
and are not always available
for analysis, which would
pose a challenge to conduct
such a study
2.2. Relation between Communications and Safety in AHS
AHS systems have prospered in surface mining with outstanding results, which
increased the demand to adopt autonomous mining. Manufacturers have placed the
greatest emphasis on safety, which is seen as the essence of mining operations. From
collisions to high weather temperatures to difficult ground conditions, robotic autonomy
has aided in operating in such harsh environments. This can be done either by improving
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the efficiency or by allowing robots to operate in areas that humans find inoperable.
Marshall et al. [11] discuss how robotics have contributed to mining and other domains
regarding the following areas:
• Assist workers in hazardous environments that pose health risks, such as excessive
heat, dust, poisonous smoke, or hydrogen sulfide (H2S).
• Fulfill labor shortages.
• Provide an opportunity to increase health and safety.
• Outperform humans in terms of performance.
Reliable communication has a significant role in the prosperity of AHS systems. ATs
can communicate via various communications with the command center to collect data
from neighbors, control telemetry, and monitor the health and safety of components. Using
a secure communication system, the command center can guide trucks as well as manage
them to enable tracking the mining operations. It is important to note that the mining
environment is the same as any other industrial environment. That is, mining operations
would effectively benefit from technological advancement in communications, but they
also suffer from the same vulnerabilities with some particularities pertaining to the mining
environment. In particular, AHS in mining relies heavily on wireless communications that
were considered unfit for industrial operation at some point. However, as stated in [8],
with the industrial revolution 4.0 and the integration of CPS and IoT systems in mining (i.e.,
in the industry in general), communication technologies have become essential for daily
operation. Indeed, an autonomous truck must maintain continuous communication with
central control. Otherwise, communication failure, even for a single piece of equipment,
means the whole fleet will stop running. Technically, this is called “mine shutdown” due
to communication loss. According to [6], AHS relies entirely on wireless technology for
secure production and supervisory control. As a result, a stable network infrastructure
(wired and wireless) is critical to AHS operations.
Since the advent of Industry 4.0, Wi-Fi technology has been an integral part of in-
dustrial operation [8]. Wireless Networks (WNs) have also opened new opportunities for
business, such as easy deployment with lower cost. Despite the essential role of WNs in
linking field devices and mobile assets, they face some difficulties that could affect both
credibility and availability of operations. Labbe [6] demonstrates that AHS communica-
tions are susceptible to known attacks such as Wi-Fi De-Auth, which is a DoS assault on
key operations. The authors in [7] show how existing wireless standards are insufficient
to meet the demands of Industry 4.0. Sisinni et al. [23] argue that the advent of IoT and
CPS in the industrial environment have caused existing Wi-Fi standards to lose traction as
they are not capable of handling dense and large-scale deployments. Signal interference,
topology control in the mining environment, and signal jamming are some of the issues
inherited from 802.11 standards [8].
In addition, Kiziroglou et al. [24] address the relevance of wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) and their capacity to improve safety as well as availability in a mining environment.
The authors also highlight current challenges and how the mining industry should take
advantage of WSNs. For that reason, WSNs could assist in the following areas of mining
operations:
• Localization services, especially for AHS vehicles that require high precision and low
latency.
• Data collection and analysis to minimize downtime that is a critical factor in extending
the lifetime of an operation along with aiding in optimizing operations and achieving
proactive maintenance.
• Health and safety are paramount in mining industry; sensing technology may assist
in gathering data from the field to monitor both employee and equipment health,
especially in areas where toxic gases are present (e.g., H2S). Furthermore, proximity
sensors are designed to prevent and detect obstacles along with dangerous condi-
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tions while trucks are driving in an autonomous mode, which is essential in mining
operations.
Despite the advantages of WSNs implementation (e.g., low cost, flexible design, and
real-time monitoring), they still suffer from some significant drawbacks that restrict their ap-
plication to specific areas [25]. For instance, WSNs protocols rely on the 802.15.4 standards
with lower energy consumption as a primary aim. Thus, the majority of these protocols
are designed for low-data-rate proximity applications, which makes them ideal in smaller
environments (i.e., mining environments would require a high data rate and significant
proximity). Although some 802.14.5 protocols, such as WilressHART, are built to support
security in the industrial environment, ensuring confidentiality might be challenging. That
is, WSNs sensors consume lower energy that limits their ability to encrypt with more secure
algorithms.
Private LTE (pLTE) is a viable alternative solution to traditional 802.11 technology
(Wi-Fi) that could provide robust communication and evade WSNs limitations [26]. In [26],
the authors demonstrate how pLTE addresses performance attributes. Additionally, they
highlight how the global LTE ecosystem enables private enterprises to deploy and operate
LTE networks independently of licensed service providers. Furthermore, the provision of
an open-access spectrum (e.g., 3.5 GHz in the United States and 5 GHz worldwide [27])
enables organizations to deploy pLTE networks. In addition, pLTE networks guarantee
adequate coverage, particularly in remote areas such as mines. It also has the potential to
uplink/downlink traffic capacity, especially where video streaming is used. Subsequently,
organizations with private LTE have increased control over network traffic, Quality of
Service (QoS), and security, and the network can be customized to optimize reliability and
latency in challenging environments, such as mining.
Additionally, pLTE would reduce maintenance costs since Long-Term Evolution
(LTE) infrastructure does not need as many towers as traditional Wi-Fi due to its higher
spectral efficiency. It also could alleviate contention issues associated with other existing
networks. In terms of security, pLTE leverages well-established cellular network security
infrastructure, e.g., Classic SIM-based and non-SIM options security. Due to the above,
pLTE seems to be the savior solution, although it comes with a high price tag and the
assumption that there is already an infrastructure ready to be deployed. Furthermore, pLTE
solutions might be subject to approval and discretion by local governments, especially
when it comes to the licensed spectrum.
Nowadays, several ongoing advancements proceed in the field of autonomous vehicle
technologies. Specified standards developed by the IEEE team (i.e., IEEE 802.11p) for
vehicular networks are known as Wireless Access for Vehicular Environment (WAVE).
Furthermore, Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) is one among these tech-
nologies that is deployed for short- to medium-range communications, especially for
vehicular networks. The DSRC/WAVE technology has been utilized for distinct vehicu-
lar applications including infotainment, resource efficiency, and safety applications [28].
Regarding mining truck autonomy, Abdellah and Paul [29] survey the performance of dif-
ferent routing protocols when used for cooperative collision warning in mines. This study
could serve as guidance for the design of new traffic control systems that prioritize safety
applications. In addition, faster data packet dissemination is emphasized for cooperative
collision notification in underground mining such as deploying 5G technology. In addition,
the authors in [29] address the compatibility of vehicular networks (i.e., AHS in our case)
with communication standards such as IEEE 802.11x, WiMax, and DSRC/WAVE standards.
Table 2 summarizes the most recent technologies, their characteristics and limitations in
AHS environments.
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Table 2. Summary of literature on cybersecurity and safety.
Papers UsedTechniques/Technologies
Security and Safety
Challenges Addressed Advantages Disadvantages
[8]
Wi-Fi technology is
essential in AHS mining
and Industry 4.0
AHS trucks require constant
communication with central
command and with each
other
Presented new advantages
for the business, such as low
cost and easy deployment
Vulnerabilities such as Wi-Fi
De-Auth, which is DoS
attacks on critical
operations. The authors of
[7] explain how the current
wireless standards alone are
not adequate to address
Industry 4.0 requirements
[24] WSNs to increase safety
Monitor safety of
equipment and operators
when applicable in mining
environment
Collect real-time data in the




areas. A proximity sensor is
designed to identify and
avoid hazards while trucks
are in autonomous mode,
particularly in mining
operations
WSN protocols are based on
the 802.15.4 standard with a
low energy usage objective.
802.14.5 protocols support




might be a challenge due to
the limited battery life of
sensor nodes that affects
their ability to encrypt with
more secure algorithms
[26]
Use of pLTE as medium of
communication in the
mine
Lack of topology and
coverage issues
Private organizations can
(in some countries) deploy
and operate LTE networks






mines, and the potential to
increase the capacity of
uplink/downlink traffic for
better video streaming




impact on the safety of
mines






The first to address the
usage of DSRC/Wave in the
underground mine topology
with the Rayleigh fading
channel for emergency
message dissemination










Since our primary design goal is functionality, it is not unexpected nor rare to discover
security flaws in applications that were designed to perform a particular task. However,
lack of security can be detected once these applications are placed in open networks. Hence,
we quickly realize the significant degradation effect in functionality because security was
not a part of the initial design as mentioned earlier by Kim et al. [14]. Autonomous mines
(i.e., mines in general) are not an exception to this phenomenon in which manufacturers
strived to develop smart machinery that can be remotely operated and controlled as well as
autonomously perform the work. Nevertheless, the cybersecurity aspect of this equipment
is being implemented as an afterthought. In such a context, the aim of the cyberattacks may
be to sabotage or slow down the ATs due to a competitive company in the market. Through
this survey, we lightened how securing communication in an industrial environment is
highly dependent on general practices and guidelines, as stated in [6].
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According to the literature and discussion above, more real cases should be considered
for study to understand the impact of the GPS attacks on AHS in the mining industry.
Aspects including the signal strength, direction of arrival, and signal clock can be consid-
ered so as to identify fake signals as well prevent GPS attacks. A successful GPS attack
can deviate the ATs from the target’s true positions. A catastrophic collision of two or
more trucks can also occur, resulting in the loss of people and resources. On the other
hand, camera attacks are discussed in several studies, such as [9,21,30,31]. These papers
have highlighted ideas about protection from camera attacks, without presenting practical
solutions or countermeasures to camera attacks. Camera attacks are extremely dangerous
since ATs may be unable to detect obstacles or recognize traffic signs in the mine resulting
in ATs collisions. Thus, more investigations and solutions are still needed to observe the
effect of camera attacks on the safe operations of the AHS environments.
The discussion in Section 2.1 revealed that most of the cybersecurity challenges that
exist recently in mining are due to the absence of standardization and oriented solutions.
The availability, productivity, and safety of operations are subjected to the security of
communications when we project these challenges onto real-world applications, e.g.,
AHS. Wireless communication technologies such as LTE and 5G would achieve a rapid
transformation of the AHS in the mining environment [32]. Thus, incorporating these
technologies into the mining operations will give rise to opportunities for new attack
vectors in the industrial environment. This leads us to the earlier claim that there is a
current necessity for a well-studied procedure or guideline to tackle specific issues in the
mine. As an example, what is the ultimate channel utilization and power transmit (Tx)
within the mine? How can rouge access points be prohibited from injecting traffic into
the mining network in the presence of mine challenges with signal processing? Is the
IEEE802.11 wireless protocol a viable mining solution (i.e., especially for AHS) or should
different solutions be suggested, e.g., pLTE, 4G, and 5G systems?
Furthermore, there is a strong relationship between cybersecurity and communication
technologies in the mining industry. DSRC-WAVE technology is also considered a suitable
vehicular communication technology (i.e., vehicle to everything (V2X)) for autonomous
vehicles in the mining industry, according to Abdullah et al. [29]. This technology enables
a variety of applications for autonomous vehicles, including safety and resource efficiency
applications [28]. As a result, the investigation of DSRC communication technology in the
mining industry, especially the AHS, is still an open issue. For example, an unauthorized
emergency message disseminated among the autonomous trucks can cause disruption
in the mining operation. The integrity of the propagated message is not maintained,
which could lead to wrong decisions related to the mining operations. Although these
communication technologies will outperform current technologies in terms of bandwidth
and latency, they would be exposed to different variant of cybersecurity attacks, such the
case of jamming attacks [33].
5G, pLTE, and DSRC-WAVE, as any previous wireless communication technologies,
are vulnerable to common attacks such as jamming attacks, which produce deliberate
interference in order to obstruct genuine users’ communication. Such types of attacks (i.e.,
jamming attacks) pose a serious risk to public safety, and hence mining safety too. Therefore,
the mining industry, when developing AHS systems adopting any of these technologies,
should develop a comprehensive security strategy for enabling these technologies in
automated mines using AHS-based systems.
All of these issues inspired us to pose even more in-depth questions and investigate
different directions. For instance, in areas where both AHS and manual mining might be
simultaneously used, what are the cybersecurity ramifications of having them both on the
same network? Up until the writing of this paper, there were no industry standards or
regulations that impose any specifications. Instead, organizations are repurposing other
industry standards to fit within the mining environment, as previously mentioned. Overall,
this study seeks to bridge the gap between existing standards and mining applications in
cybersecurity, specifically network infrastructure. Yet, we believe a comprehensive solution
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would take into consideration security during the design phase as well as build solutions
purposely to accommodate the mining environment and its applications, such as the AHS
system.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, a type of Cyber-physical Systems (CPS), i.e., an AHS in the mining
environment, was discussed in terms of cybersecurity, reliable communication, and safety.
AHS-based trucks have been shown to be very useful in the mining industry. However, the
safety of using such trucks has not been thoroughly investigated. The literature was then
surveyed to identify and discuss the relation between safety of AHS in the mining environ-
ment and both cybersecurity and communication. The relation between cybersecurity and
safety in AHS systems was discussed and it was found that compromising cybersecurity
would threaten the safety of mining operations leading to loses in people and equipment.
In addition, we have shown that the reliability of wireless communication is mandatory
for the safety of AHS operations. Through this survey, there are several open issues and
challenges that may entail further studies and investigations. It was discussed that new
technologies such 5G, pLTE and DSRC-WAVE could be good alternatives for the currently
used IEEE 802.11. Although these communication technologies would outperform current
technologies in terms of bandwidth and latency, they would be exposed to traditional or
new cybersecurity threats or attacks, which still need to be considered while designing
AHS systems and studied in the mining environment.
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Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
CPS Cyber-physical Systems
AHS Autonomous Haulage System
OT Operating Technology
ATs Autonomous Trucks
EMV Equipped Manual Vehicle
ICS Industrial Control Systems
AHT Autonomous Haulage Trucks




GPS Global Positioning System
WNs Wireless Networks
WSNs Wireless Sensor Networks
LTE Long-Term Evolution
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communications
WAVE Wireless Access for the Vehicular Environment
pLTE private LTE
QoS Quality of Service
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